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Abstract 
 
I present a rationale for a government to discriminate between debt and equity financing when taxing 
corporate income. For risk-averse entrepreneurs, equity generates more surplus than debt, because it 
provides financing and insurance. A government seeking to extract surplus from entrepreneurs would 
naturally tax equity-generated income more than debt-generated income. I also establish a less obvious 
reason why the government might want to extract surplus from entrepreneurs. It is well understood 
that when the quality of projects is unobservable to investors, risk-averse entrepreneurs with higher-
return projects might retain a larger share of equity to signal their type (Leland and Pyle (1977)). I 
show that in such an adverse selection setting, while competitive investors are constrained to offer 
actuarially fair terms, the government can use taxes to discriminate between types. This degree of 
freedom allows manipulation of the relevant incentive constraints so that a lower level of debt suffices 
for separation, and an increase in overall efficiency can be obtained. Since entrepreneurs separate 
along their debt-to-equity ratios, the optimal non-linear tax schedule to achieve the desired 
discrimination is isomorphic to one that taxes debt-generated income at a lower rate than equity-
generated income. 
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1 Introduction
Many tax codes do not treat debt and equity financing equally. While interest
payments for loans can often be deducted from the corporate income tax base, div-
idends to equity holders are taxed as profits on the firm side (and then often again
as capital income on the investor’s side). This constitutes discrimination in favor of
debt financing, which is widely believed to be suboptimal. In this paper, I present
a reason why a government might optimally choose to discriminate between debt
and equity financing. When provided by a competitive financial market, debt and
equity financing generate different levels of surplus for the entrepreneur: While both
help the entrepreneur to realize the implementation gain of his project, equity also
provides insurance. A government aiming to extract the surplus from entrepreneurs
thus has no reason to tax income generated by different means of financing at the
same rate.
The rationale for a government to aim to extract surplus, though, is less obvi-
ous. Risk-averse entrepreneurs whose projects differ in expected returns, typically
differ in their willingness to pay for insurance of the same risk. Yet, if financial
markets are competitive and insurance can be obtained at actuarially fair terms,
every such entrepreneur prefers equity to debt. Perfect insurance is obtained only
when the complete ownership of the project is sold to an investor. However, if the
characteristics of projects are unobservable to investors ex-ante, catering to different
entrepreneurs becomes a problem of screening types. Leland and Pyle (1977) have
shown that in this case entrepreneurs with higher-return projects will retain a larger
share of their project to signal their type to investors.
How does tax discrimination between debt and equity influence the outcome of
this signaling game? Much along the lines of Spence (1973), using more debt to
finance a new investment is a costly and socially inefficient signal. It is wasteful,
because the risk-averse party needs to take more risk than if information were sym-
metric. Then, subsidizing the wasteful signal might simply lead to an increased use
of debt, but most likely not to a difference in the outcome of the signaling game1.
However, this logic only applies if debt receives an absolute subsidy. The typical cor-
porate income tax schedule instead entails only a relative subsidy of debt over equity.
In this paper, I show that relative discrimination between debt and equity can
instead lead to a more efficient outcome. Adverse selection necessitates the use of
1There are two caveats: First, if the entrepreneurs’ preferences exhibit increasing absolute risk
aversion, a linear subsidy to debt might draw in more lower types, thereby weakening the signal.
At the shares of retained equity that the high types are able to afford when trading off their risk
aversion against the combined incentives for using debt (the signaling value and the tax incentives),
investors might not be able to infer their types anymore, as the same tax subsidy might have led to
lower types retaining the same shares of their projects. A separating equilibrium might then fail to
exist. Second, the tax schedule would have to include a no-arbitrage condition, so that types can
take out at most enough debt to bridge the gap in financing that arises due to a lower equity issue.
With a tax subsidy, the highest types, who would be willing to keep almost all the ownership of
their project, will run into that constraint. They cannot increase the share of debt any further to
separate themselves from lower types, so some pooling at the top might result.
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debt as a signal. The level of debt necessary for separation is thus dictated by the
incentive constraints of a screening problem. Competition between investors does
not allow for any further price discrimination between types - everyone receives his
equilibrium amount of insurance at actuarially fair terms. The government, how-
ever, is not restricted to the prices dictated by competition. Instead, it can use
differential taxation to implement a form of price discrimination between types that
resembles the pricing choice of a monopolist investor/insurer. This degree of freedom
allows additional manipulation of the incentive constraints and can thus lead to a
lower overall use of debt. Such an increase in efficiency requires extracting surplus
from entrepreneurs. While the equilibrium with taxes can be more efficient than
the competitive equilibrium, it overall distributes away from the entrepreneurs and
toward other parts of the economy (not modeled here). Studies comparing monopo-
listic versus competitive insurance markets come to similar conclusions (e.g. Stiglitz
(1977), Dahlby (1987), de Feo and Hindriks (2009)).
The optimal discrimination between types generally calls for a non-linear tax on
corporate income. I show that since entrepreneurs separate along their debt-to-
equity ratios, the optimal tax schedule is isomorphic to one that taxes the fraction
of income generated with equity differently from that generated with debt financing.
In such a schedule, each type faces a higher tax rate on equity-financed income than
on debt-financed income, because the surplus generated by equity financing is larger
(implementation and insurance gains). In some cases, even a linear schedule with
separate tax rates on the fraction of income generated by debt versus equity with a
debt bias approximates the optimal non-linear tax schedule that maximizes revenue.
Related Literature
The modern discussion about what determines the capital structure of corporations
started with the seminal contribution by Modigliani and Miller (1958). They state
that in an efficient market and in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy and agency costs,
and asymmetric information, the value of the firm is invariant with respect to its
capital structure. Relaxing any of these conditions in turn and analyzing the result-
ing optimal capital structure has since been a major focus of the corporate finance
literature. Harris and Raviv (1991) provide a comprehensive overview.
Many tax codes favor debt financing over equity. For corporations, interest pay-
ments on loans are to a large extent deductible from the tax base, while dividend
returns to equity holders are not. In the US, Graham (2000) estimates the tax ben-
efits for debt to amount to 9.7% of firm value. de Mooij (2011) reports that the
cost of equity-financed investment was higher than that of debt-financed investment
in 2007 for firms in the US, Japan, and the EU-27. Bradley et al. (1984) survey
the large literature that has investigated the effects of this discrimination between
means of financing. The general argument is that firms choose the optimal level
of debt by trading off tax incentives against the potential costs of financial distress
resulting from debt financing.
Whether firms do indeed base their choice of capital structure on the tax incen-
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tives for debt has long been questioned2. However, recent studies do find evidence
for the hypothesis that “the desirability of debt finance at the margin increases with
the firm’s effective marginal tax rate on deductible interest” (MacKie-Mason (1990),
p.1482). The behavioral response of firms to the “debt bias” has been quantified
most recently by Gorden and Lee (2001, 2007). They estimate that shifting from
the average tax distortion to no tax distortion would reduce debt-to-capital ratios
by 0.022, implying that an additional 2.2% of capital would be financed with equity
rather than debt (Gordon and Lee (2007)).
These studies focus on the optimal financing decision from the firm’s point of view,
taking the debt bias in corporate income tax schedules as given. None of them
ask why it might be in the government’s interest to implement such discrimination.
Despite the arguments against this discrimination, it has persisted over time, and
might have even become larger (de Mooij (2011)). Yet, the general consensus is
that discrimination between debt and equity should be eliminated (as for example
Auerbach et al. (2010) argue in the Mirrlees Review).
In contrast to the static tax incentive versus bankruptcy costs trade-off view, a large
stream of the corporate finance literature following Modigliani and Miller (1958)
has considered asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and financiers and
its effect on firms’ capital structure. A firm’s choice of the means of financing, so
the main argument runs, might contain information about its underlying value. The
signal conveyed to investors and the associated costs in terms of firm valuation are
what determines the decision to issue new equity or debt.
In a seminal contribution, Myers and Majluf (1984) have argued that information
asymmetries can explain why the stock price of a company typically declines after
new equity is issued. If investors cannot observe the underlying value of a firm (e.g.
the quality of a new project for which the firm seeks financing), they will factor in
some probability that the entrepreneur or manager of the firm is behaving oppor-
tunistically, issuing shares when they are overvalued. Issuing debt does not affect the
price of financing in the same way - the value of debt, especially safe or highly rated
debt, is largely unaffected by a change in the stock price. A number of studies have
tested the implications of this theory empirically, and have found evidence for stock
price decreases related to new equity issues (see Dierkens (1991) for a summary).
Myers (1984) therefore proposes a “pecking order” of corporate finance. According
to this theory, firms finance new projects with internal funds first, and only after
exhausting them seek outside capital, first in the form of safe debt and only when
absolutely necessary through new equity. These papers consider firms as risk-neutral
agents. One important difference between debt and equity, however, is the amount
of risk the entrepreneur can shift to the investor.
On the investment side of the financing transaction, Gordon and Bradford (1980)
2MacKie-Mason (1990) briefly surveys Titman and Wessels (1988), Fischer et al. (1989), Ang and
Peterson (1986), Long and Malitz (1985), Bradley et al. (1984), and Marsh (1982) as “studies that
fail to find plausible or significant tax effects”(p.1471).
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have considered a model with risk-averse investors. They conclude that an investor’s
portfolio mix of stocks and bonds will depend on the tax rates he faces as well as
his risk-aversion. When tax rates are not linear and absolute risk aversion is not
perfectly constant, the individually optimal mix will depend on the overall size of
the portfolio.
Leland and Pyle (1977) instead consider a setup with risk-averse entrepreneurs that
is most closely related to the one presented here. In this case, with everything else
equal, debt is a less attractive means of raising capital, because the entrepreneur
has to bear more risk compared to selling shares in his firm. The authors then show
that entrepreneurs retaining a higher stake in their firm can serve as a signal of
confidence to investors, so that those with higher quality projects would be willing
to retain higher shares of equity (and instead issue debt to meet their financing
needs) simply to separate themselves from lower type entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs
weigh the benefit from receiving more favorable terms of financing (due to a higher
market valuation of their firm) against the cost of having to bear more risk. This
finding parallels those of the classic insurance literature pioneered by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976), as well as the literature on education as a signaling device initiated
by Spence (1973). Accordingly, the results of the present paper relate to findings in
the insurance literature that compares monopolistic and competitive provision, first
introduced by Stiglitz (1977) and Dahlby (1987), and more recently generalized by
Chade and Schlee (2011) and de Feo and Hindriks (2009).
Recently, other authors have considered the optimal taxation point of view on cor-
porate income taxation in setups with asymmetric information. The main concern
of this literature has been the inefficient entry of entrepreneurs in models of occu-
pational choice. Gathak et al. (2007) show that if entrepreneurs differ along only
one dimension, a lump-sum tax on entrepreneurs can correct against an excessive
entry of low type entrepreneurs. Scheuer (2011) investigates a model where en-
trepreneurs differ along two dimensions. Then, credit market imperfections lead to
the government optimally intervening with a nonlinear subsidy on entrepreneurial
profits, due to the inefficient entry of entrepreneurial types at both ends of the ability
distribution. None of these papers derives an optimal tax schedule that involves dis-
crimination between debt and equity. However, unlike this paper, they all consider
risk-neutral entrepreneurs, and therefore disregard the potential of tax discrimina-
tion along the dimension of risk aversion.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I set up a model reminis-
cent of Leland and Pyle (1977), where risk-averse entrepreneurs with heterogeneous
projects seek financing from competitive investors. Asymmetric information about
the quality of projects results in an adverse selection problem. To illustrate my
point, I employ a setup with two types of entrepreneurs. Section 3 describes the
competitive equilibrium in this economy. Section 4 then analyzes a government’s
opportunities to intervene. It is first shown that the revenue-maximizing tax sched-
ule implements price discrimination between types and generally leads to a different
level of debt for the high-return type entrepreneur than in the competitive equilib-
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rium. Section 4.1 then proceeds to show that a tax schedule with a debt bias can be
designed to collect the same revenue as the optimal tax schedule. Finally, section
4.2 analyzes a specific example in which even a linear tax schedule with different
rates on debt versus equity-generated income approximates the optimal non-linear
schedule. Section 5 concludes.
2 Setup
Consider an economy populated by entrepreneurs who seek financing for their projects
and investors who compete to provide the funds.
Entrepreneurs
There exists a continuum of entrepreneurs of size one. Each entrepreneur owns the
idea for a project, but has no initial wealth to cover the required setup costs I
to implement his project. Entrepreneurs are risk-averse, their utility function u is
increasing, strictly concave, differentiable and exhibits non-increasing absolute risk
aversion (NIARA).
Entrepreneurs are of two different types, indicated by index i ∈ {L,H}. β and
(1 − β) are their respective shares in the population. Types differ with respect to
the return their project can generate. In particular, I assume that an implemented
project produces a gross return of
Y (θi, E) = I + θi + E. (1)
Here, θi is the individual mean return (net of the setup costs I) that differs with the
type of the entrepreneur, and is known to him even before the implementation of the
project. E represents an aggregate shock, its realization is unknown to everybody
at the time of interaction between entrepreneurs and investors.
I assume that
(A1) E ∈ {,−}, with E[E] = 0.
(A2)  is small compared to θi: 0 <  << θL < θH .
Assumption (A1) implies that a risk-neutral agent would disregard the aggregate
shock in his optimization of ex-ante utility. However, since entrepreneurs are risk-
averse, they do take the aggregate risk into account when deciding whether to im-
plement their project. Assumption (A2) implies that the initial setup costs I are
always recovered. Every project has a positive return.
Although they have no initial wealth, entrepreneurs do have outside options, de-
noted by ψi. For example, one might think of entrepreneurs being able to implement
their project elsewhere in the world, or to simply remain in the labor force of the
economy’s productive sector. I assume that
(A3) ψi < Ci, where Ci is the certainty equivalent defined by u(Ci) = E[u(θi +E)];
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(A4) CH > θL.
Assumption (A3) ensures that entrepreneurs are willing to implement their projects
if they are offered financing at sufficiently good terms. Assumption (A4) puts a
joint restriction on θL − θH (the spread of the mean returns), the aggregate risk E
and the concavity of the entrepreneurs’ utility function. It essentially places a lower
bound on the spread of safe outside options. With this assumption, I am restricting
attention to cases where an equilibrium always exists.
Investors
The financial market consists of a large number of risk-neutral investors, each with
unlimited funds. They can either invest at the safe gross interest rate normalized to
(A5) R = 1
or finance projects.
Investors can offer financing contracts to entrepreneurs. A financial contract is a
pair (x, T ) ∈ (0, 1)×R. I denote by x ∈ (0, 1) the share of the project that remains
in the ownership of the entrepreneur. Thus, x = 0 corresponds to an equity con-
tract where complete ownership of the project is transferred to the investor, while
x = 1 denotes a pure debt contract where the entrepreneur remains the owner of his
project. x is thus a measure of the degree of insurance the entrepreneur purchases
(where a smaller x corresponds to more insurance).
In any case, the contract specifies a fixed payment T to the entrepreneur, which
is net of the setup cost I. It is without loss of generality to consider only contracts
where T is not a function of the realization of the aggregate shock E3. It is useful
to think of T as reflecting the price the entrepreneur pays for a financing service
with a degree of insurance x. Since realized output Yi perfectly reveals all private
information, contracts must be restricted to not being contingent on it. Otherwise,
a simple penalty for lying about the true type would easily circumvent the adverse
selection problem that is at the heart of this study. The payoffs realized do depend
on realized output for all players holding parts of the ownership rights.
Timing
The strategic interaction considered is the following:
1. Entrepreneurs learn their type.
2. Investors offer a set of contracts, denoted by X = {(x, T ) ∈ (0, 1)× R}. They
are subsequently committed to honoring the terms of the offers.
3In principle, a debt contract could specify a T that depends on the realization of E. This would
be the case if entrepreneurs were asked to pay an interest rate on their debt that is so high that
they might not be able to afford it in the bad state. However, competition between investors will
ensure that interest rates on debt contracts are at least equal to the safe rate R = 1. Assumption
(A2) then ensures that limited liability is never a binding constraint.
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3. Entrepreneurs choose whether to implement their projects (let ξi ∈ {0, 1} rep-
resent that decision), and if so which contract to accept. They can accept
only one contract4. Accordingly, payments Ti are made and the projects im-
plemented.
4. Aggregate uncertainty is realized and returns are distributed according to the
contracted ownership of shares.
The concept of competition between investors is similar to that introduced by Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976). As is well known, in this setup an equilibrium might not
exist. Assumption (A4) does ensure, however, that an equilibrium always exists5.
3 Equilibrium without Taxes
In the last active stage, each entrepreneur makes an implementation decision ξi ∈
{0, 1} and decides which contract to sign, taking the set of contracts offered as given.
He solves:
max
ξ,(x,T )
ξ E[u(x(θ + E) + T )] + (1− ξ)u(ψ)
s.t. ξ ∈ {0, 1} and (x, T ) ∈ X. (2)
The financial market in this economy is competitive. Thus, even though investors
are maximizing their expected profits, in equilibrium they will make zero profits
in expectation. Entrepreneurs on the other hand are risk-averse; how much of the
aggregate risk they have to bear plays a decisive role in their implementation and
financing decisions.
Definition 1
An equilibrium is a set of contracts X = {(xi, Ti) ∈ (0, 1) × R, i = L,H} and an
implementation decision ξi of each entrepreneur such that:
(i) entrepreneurs maximize their expected utility;
(ii) investors make zero expected profits.
3.1 Observable Types
In a first-best world, investors are able to observe an entrepreneur’s type and can
offer type-specific contracts. Since investors are competitive, the optimal contract
for a type i entrepreneur maximizes his expected utility, subject to a zero expected
profit constraint for the investor. The implementation decision is made taking into
account the entrepreneur’s outside option ψi:
4This is a short cut to assuming that trades are observable.
5Classic (e.g. Riley (1979)) as well as more recent studies (e.g. Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002)) have
modified the Rothschild-Stiglitz concept of competitive equilibrium to deal with the non-existence
of equilibrium problem. The general consensus is that there always exists a separating equilibrium.
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max
ξi,(xi,Ti)
ξi E[u(xi(θi + E) + Ti)] + (1− ξi)u(ψi)
s.t. (1− xi)θi − Ti ≥ 0. (3)
Lemma 1
If types are observable, in equilibrium all projects are implemented in the econ-
omy. All entrepreneurs obtain full insurance at actuarially fair terms: ξi = 1 and
(x∗i , T
∗
i ) = (0, θi) ∀i.
Proof : Suppose that ξi = 1. Then, the optimal contract solves
max
(xi,Ti)
1
2
[u(xi(θi + ) + Ti) + u(xi(θi − ) + Ti)]
s.t.
1
2
[u(xi(θi + ) + Ti) + u(xi(θi − ) + Ti)] ≥ u(ψi) (4)
(1− xi)θi − Ti ≥ 0. (5)
The first-order conditions for this optimization are:
[xi]
1
2
(1 + µ) [u′(xi(θi + ) + Ti)(θi + ) + u′(xi(θi − ) + Ti)(θi − )] =λθi (6)
[Ti]
1
2
(1 + µ) [u′(xi(θi + ) + Ti) + u′(xi(θi − ) + Ti)] =λ, (7)
where µ and λ are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the individual rationality
constraint of the entrepreneur (4) and the zero expected profit condition for the
investor (5) respectively. These necessary conditions for optimality require
θi =
u′(xi(θi + ) + Ti)(θi + ) + u′(xi(θi − ) + Ti)(θi − )
u′(xi(θi + ) + Ti) + u′(xi(θi − ) + Ti) , (8)
which implies x∗i = 0. The zero expected profit constraint (5) determines T
∗
i = θi.
A contract (xi = 0, T = θi) satisfies the individual rationality constraint of en-
trepreneur i, and so he optimally chooses ξi = 1. 
Borch’s Rule6 of optimal risk sharing implies that the risk-neutral party (here the
investor) should bear all the risk. Each entrepreneurial type receives full insurance.
Competition between investors implies that in equilibrium entrepreneurs will be of-
fered actuarially fair insurance. Being offered such favorable terms, all entrepreneurs
optimally decide to implement their projects, and sell their firms to an investor in
an equity contract.
Financial contracts serve two purposes: They provide financing to set up the project
as well as insurance against the aggregate risk. In a first-best world, one could think
of separate markets for these two tasks. Each entrepreneur would then issue safe debt
to finance the setup costs I and sign a separate insurance contract. The first-best
allocation in such a world would be equivalent to the setup presented.
6See Borch (1962).
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3.2 Unobservable Types
Suppose now that investors in the economy cannot observe an entrepreneur’s type,
and so are uncertain about the mean expected return of their investment when offer-
ing to buy a share of equity. The first-best set of contracts cannot be an equilibrium
anymore. Since T ∗L < T
∗
H , every entrepreneur would claim to have a high-return idea
to maximize the price he can fetch from selling the ownership rights to his project.
The investor’s zero expected profit condition would then be violated, he would make
certain losses. Recall that while realized returns are perfectly informative about the
entrepreneur’s type, investors are by assumption precluded from offering contracts
with payments T contingent on realized returns.
The equilibrium implementation decisions and set of contracts in this adverse selec-
tion problem are the solution to a standard screening problem. Since preferences
exhibit NIARA, they satisfy the single-crossing property. By the Revelation Prin-
ciple7 it suffices to design contracts that are incentive-compatible for each type of
entrepreneur to choose the contract that is meant for him.
max
ξi,X
β {ξL E[u(xL(θL + E) + TL)] + (1− ξL)u(ψL)}+
(1− β) {ξH E[u(xH(θH + E) + TH)] + (1− ξH)u(ψH)}
s.t. ξL E[u(xL(θL + E) + TL)] ≥ ξL E[u(xH(θL + E) + TH)] (9)
ξH E[u(xH(θH + E) + TH)] ≥ ξH E[u(xL(θH + E) + TL)] (10)
ξLβ[(1− xL)θL] + ξH(1− β)[(1− xH)θH ] ≥ ξLβ TL + ξHβ TH (11)
The optimization is now further constrained by (9) and (10), the incentive compati-
bility constraints for entrepreneurial types L and H respectively. Investors breaking
even in expectation is ensured by constraint (11). With the added complication of an
information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors, not all entrepreneurs
obtain full insurance in equilibrium:
Lemma 2
If types are unobservable, in the unique equilibrium all projects are implemented:
ξi = 1 for i = L,H. In particular,
(i) type L entrepreneurs obtain full insurance at actuarially fair terms:
(xL, TL) = (0, θL);
(ii) type H entrepreneurs obtain partial insurance at actuarially fair terms:
(xH , TH) = (0 < xH ≤ 1, (1− xH)θH).
Proof : See appendix A.1.
Even though investors are risk-neutral, they cannot provide full insurance to all
7See for example Myerson (1979) and Harris and Townsend (1981).
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entrepreneurs. Due to asymmetric information, full insurance for all types could
only be granted in a pooling equilibrium, where type H entrepreneurs receive less
than actuarially fair insurance and subsidize type L entrepreneurs. Just as in the
canonical Rothschild-Stiglitz model, such a pooling contract is not an equilibrium:
A contract that offers a little less insurance and attracts only high types, without
subsidizing low types, is a profitable deviation. This type of cream-skimming by
investors rules out a pooling equilibrium.
Just as in the insurance literature, in the separating equilibrium, higher types (i.e.
lower risks) receive less insurance. This property of the equilibrium parallels the
findings of Leland and Pyle (1977): Higher type entrepreneurs retain a higher share
of their projects to signal their type to the market.
Competition between investors drives their expected profits to zero. All the sur-
plus generated from implementing projects and providing (partial) insurance accrue
to the entrepreneurs.
4 Equilibrium with Taxes
Suppose the government of the economy is aiming to extract the surplus entrepreneurs
make. One might think of entrepreneurs as being foreign to the economy, and free
to set up their projects anywhere in the world. A government might then want to
ensure that some (or all) of the surplus generated through the use of the economy’s
financial market is recovered. More generally, one might also think of a government
trying to redistribute away from entrepreneurs to other parts of the economy (not
modeled in the presented setup).
I assume that the government announces a tax schedule τ at the beginning of time
and is subsequently committed to it. Taxes can in principle depend on types, and
on the specifics of the financing contract (x, T ), and are always collected from the
entrepreneur. Investors and entrepreneurs take the taxes announced as given in their
decisions. I denote the problem of a type i entrepreneur with Ui:
max
ξ,(x,T )
ξ E[u(x(θi + E) + T − τ(x, T, θi))] + (1− ξ)u(ψ)
s.t. ξ ∈ {0, 1} and (x, T ) ∈ X.
As before, the optimal financing contracts are found as a solution to the screening
problem (9)-(11), where investors take the effect of the tax schedule on the en-
trepreneurs’ decision problem into account. I denote the investor’s problem by P.
The government then solves:
max
{τ(x,T,θ)}
β ξLτ(xL, TL, θL) + (1− β) ξHτ(xH , TH , θH)
s.t. ξi ∈ argmaxUi ∀i (12)
X ∈ argmaxP. (13)
The government maximizes tax revenue and only cares about the entrepreneurs’
utility insofar as it would like their participation constraints to be satisfied.
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Definition 2
An equilibrium with taxes is a set of contracts X = {(xi, Ti) ∈ (0, 1)×R, i = L,H},
an implementation decision ξi by each entrepreneur, and a tax schedule {τ(xi, Ti, θi)}
such that:
(i) entrepreneurs maximize their expected utility, taking taxes as given;
(ii) investors make zero expected profits;
(iii) the government maximizes tax revenue.
The equilibrium is comparable in structure to the competitive equilibrium. However,
the government will tax entrepreneurial surplus.
Lemma 3
When types are unobservable, in the equilibrium with taxes all projects are imple-
mented: ξi = 1 for i = L,H. In particular,
(i) type L entrepreneurs obtain full insurance and investors pay actuarially fair
terms:
(xL, TL) = (0, θL);
(ii) type H entrepreneurs obtain partial insurance and investors pay actuarially
fair terms:
(xH , TH) = (0 < xH ≤ 1, (1− xH)θH);
(iii) type H entrepreneurs will be taxed so that they are indifferent between imple-
menting their projects or their outside option.
Proof: See appendix A.2.
This equilibrium structure is analogous to the one in Stiglitz (1977), who analyzes a
monopoly insurance problem. Indeed, the government’s objective to maximize tax
revenue coincides with that of a monopolist investor. As in Stiglitz (1977), contracts
in the equilibrium with taxes (denoted with superscript G) will generally differ from
those in the competitive equilibrium without taxes (denoted with superscript C).
Proposition 1
Generically, XG 6= XC .
Proof: See appendix A.3.
In the equilibrium without taxes, it follows from competition between investors
that debt earns no interest beyond R = 1 and all insurance is sold at actuarially fair
terms. Insurance coverage for the high types is determined solely by the incentive
constraints of the low types. Competition between investors leaves no room for price
discrimination between types of entrepreneurs. The government, however, does not
face competition. Using taxes, it can implement effective prices that differ from
those consistent with competition. It essentially acts like a monopolist, who is able
to charge differential mark-ups. This degree of freedom allows the government to
manipulate the incentive constraints of the low types such that a different level of
insurance for the high type emerges in equilibrium.
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Corollary 1
When τH > τL, type H entrepreneurs receive more insurance than in the competitive
equilibrium (xGH < x
C
H).
Proof: See appendix A.4.
The possibility of an increase in efficiency again parallels findings in the insur-
ance literature. For insurance markets with adverse selection, it has been shown
by Dahlby (1987) that coverage for the low risk types is higher when purchased
from a monopolist insurer, rather than in a competitive market. More generally,
de Feo and Hindriks (2009) show that monopolists are often more efficient at pro-
viding insurance under adverse selection than a competitive market.
It should be noted that while the equilibrium with taxation can be more efficient
than the competitive equilibrium, the necessary discrimination has distributional
consequences. The government’s objective is to maximize the revenue extracted
from the entrepreneurs. One might interpret this as a re-distributional objective
away from entrepreneurs and toward other parts of the economy (not modeled in
this paper).
4.1 Implementing the Optimal Non-linear Tax Schedule
Lemma 3 stated that the government is able to extract all the surplus from the
entrepreneurs. Generally, a non-linear tax schedule will be optimal to achieve that
objective. It will satisfy the individual rationality constraints for both types with
equality, so that no surplus is left to the entrepreneurs:
u(θL − τL) = u(ψL) (14)
E[u(θH − τH + xGHE)] = u(ψH) (15)
Proposition 2
The optimal tax schedule {τL, τH} is isomorphic to one that taxes the fraction of
income generated by equity at a higher rate than the fraction of income generated
by debt.
Proof: Define Ri as the absolute risk premium type i would be willing to pay to
avoid the risk he would be exposed to from holding all the shares in his project:
E[u(θi − τi + E)] = u(θi − τi −Ri). (16)
Since the aggregate risk is small (by assumption (A2)), the absolute risk premium
can be approximated by
Ri ≈ 1
2
riV ar(E), (17)
where ri = −u′′u′ is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion for type i
evaluated at θi − τi. Using this definition, the optimal non-linear tax schedule
satisfies
Ti = θi − ψi − (xGi )2Ri for i = L,H. (18)
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By assumption (A3), each entrepreneur’s outside option is ψi < Ci. This can always
be written as ψi = δiθi −Ri. Thus, the surplus to be taxed away is
Ti = (1− δi)θi + (1− (xGi )2)Ri for i = L,H. (19)
The first summand, (1 − δi)θi, represents the implementation gain, i.e. the surplus
generated only from obtaining financing for the setup costs and so being able to
implement the project. The rest, (1 − (xGi )2)Ri, represents the insurance gain, i.e.
the additional surplus generated from receiving insurance. From this intuition, it
is clear that the same tax revenue τi can be generated by taxing the fractions of
income generated by debt or equity at different rates:
xGi θiτ
D
i + (1− xGi )θiτEi = τi
= (1− δi)θi + (1− (xGi )2)Ri
= xGi (1− δi)θi + (1− xGi )(1− δi)θi + (1− (xGi )2)Ri.
Here, τDi is the tax rate applied to the share of income retained by the entrepreneur.
It taxes the surplus generated with debt, i.e. only a fraction of the implementation
gain. τEi is the tax rate applied to the fraction of income sold as equity to the
investors. It taxes the surplus generated by equity, which consists of both a pro-
portional fraction of the implementation gain as well as the insurance gain. Notice
that
τDi = 1− δi (20)
τEi = 1− δi + (1− xGi )
Ri
θi(1− xGi )
(21)
→ τDi < τEi . (22)
Thus, the optimal tax schedule τi is isomorphic to one that taxes the fraction of
income generated by equity at a higher rate than income generated by debt. 
Proposition 2 states that a tax schedule with a debt bias might indeed be optimal,
given the government’s objective of extracting all surplus from the entrepreneurs.
In reality, the debt bias in a typical corporate income tax schedule takes a partic-
ular form: It allows the costs of debt to be deducted from the tax base, whereas
payments to equity holders are (to a large extent) considered taxable profits. In
the model, such a debt bias would occur when a corporate income tax rate τ¯i were
levied on θi+Ti, i.e. on all of the entrepreneurs’ generated income before paying out
any equity holders. The entrepreneur thus earns (θ+Ti)(1− τ¯i)− (1− xGi )θi, where
competition determines Ti = (1− xGi )θi(1− τ¯i). This results in a double taxation of
the fraction of income generated by equity financing:
(θ + Ti)(1− τ¯i)− (1− xGi )θi = xGi θi(1− τ¯i) + (1− xGi )θi(1− τ¯i)2 (23)
= xGi θi(1− τDi ) + (1− xGi )θi(1− τEi ) (24)
with τDi < τ
E
i
8. Thus, this particular form of a debt bias is nothing other than
taxing the fraction of income generated with equity at a higher rate than the fraction
8In reality, there are many rules for what exactly can or cannot be deducted from the tax base, so
that τE will never be exactly 2τD − (τD)2 as suggested by this simple example.
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generated with debt. The debt bias observed in many tax codes might be optimal, at
least in structure, for maximizing revenue generated from corporate income taxation.
4.2 Continuum of Types with CARA Preferences
So far, I have shown that the optimal tax schedule to extract all the surplus generated
for the entrepreneurs can be implemented using separate tax rates for the fractions of
income corresponding to the share of ownership retained by the entrepreneur or sold
to an investor. The marginal tax rates on these fractions of income differ, because
with the means of financing, the surplus generated differs: While both debt and eq-
uity help the entrepreneur to realize the implementation gain, only equity provides
insurance against the aggregate risk, and so generates additional surplus. Thus, the
tax rate on debt-financed income will be lower than that on equity-financed income
for each type. However, generally, these tax rates still depend on types. So the ques-
tion arises of why the government would postulate a tax schedule with two separate
tax rates per type when it could just announce one tax payment τi per type that
incorporates all the surplus generated.
In what follows, I show that in some cases, a simple linear tax schedule for debt-
financed and equity-financed income can approximate the optimal non-linear cor-
porate tax. Since the fractions of income financed with equity vary with type, the
effective tax entrepreneurs face is still non-linear:
xiθi(1− τD) + (1− xi)θi(1− τE) = θi(1− τi) (25)
where τi = τ
E + xi(τ
D − τE). (26)
Suppose there exist a continuum of different types of entrepreneurs, indexed by
θ ∈ [θ, θ¯], 0 < θ < θ¯ < 1, with a density function f(θ) that is strictly positive,
continuous and differentiable everywhere, and satisfies a monotone likelihood ration
property. Stiglitz (1977) shows that under these conditions, a fully separating equi-
librium exists and is such that the lowest type θ receives full insurance, whereas all
other types receive only partial insurance coverage decreasing with type. Chade and
Schlee (2011) have more recently extended the analysis to provide conditions for full
separation under more general type distributions.
Moreover, suppose that entrepreneurial preferences exhibit constant absolute risk
aversion, and that each entrepreneur’s outside option is a constant fraction of the
certainty equivalent his project generates, i.e. it can be expressed as ψi = δθi − R.
Again, R is the absolute risk premium, which is now constant for all agents. Under
these assumptions, the implementation gain of an entrepreneur is proportional to
his type, while the insurance gain depends only the degree of insurance coverage.
Further, consider a population of entrepreneurs with θ¯ ≤ 2θ.
From equation (18), we know that the optimal tax schedule collects revenue
τ(θ) = (1− δ)θ + (1− x(θ)2)R (27)
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from a type θ entrepreneur. The revenue collected with linear tax rates on debt and
equity-financed income is
x(θ)θτD + (1− x(θ))θτE. (28)
The tax rates τD and τE are pinned down by the implementation gain and the
insurance gain from full insurance. A type that signs an equilibrium contract without
any insurance (x(θ) = 1, T (θ) = 0), faces only the tax rate τD, which extracts the
full implementation gain:
θτD = (1− δ)θ → τD = 1− δ. (29)
The lowest type receives full insurance, so he realizes the implementation gain and
the full insurance gain, and faces only tax rate τE, so that
θτE = (1− δ)θ +R → τE = 1− δ + R
θ
> τD. (30)
With these tax rates, the surplus extracted from any type θ with a contract (0 <
x(θ) < 1, T (θ)) generates tax revenue that is approximately the same as the optimal
tax revenue in equation (27):
x(θ)θτD + (1− x(θ))θτE ≈ (1− δ)θ + (1− x(θ)2)R
θ(τE + x(θ)(τD − τE)) ≈ (1− δ)θ + (1− x(θ)2)R
θ(1− δ + (1− x(θ))R) ≈ (1− δ)θ + (1− x(θ)2)R
θ
θ
≈ (1 + x(θ)). (31)
When the spread of mean returns is small, a linear schedule of tax rates {τD, τE}
applied to the fractions of income generated by debt and equity financing respectively
approximates the optimal non-linear tax schedule.
5 Discussion
Many governments discriminate between debt and equity financing when taxing
corporate income. Conventional wisdom, however, suggests that these means of fi-
nancing should be treated equivalently. I present a rationale for why a government
might choose to discriminate between debt and equity: Debt and equity financing
generate different levels of surplus for the entrepreneur. While both help him to
realize the implementation gain of his project, equity also provides insurance. A
government aiming to extract surplus from entrepreneurs thus has no reason to tax
income generated by different means of financing at the same rate.
A difference in surplus generated by equity versus debt only occurs when entrepreneurs
are risk-averse. Yet, if insurance can be obtained at actuarially fair terms (as is the
case in competitive financial markets), every entrepreneur prefers equity to debt.
It is then due to an adverse selection problem that different types of entrepreneurs
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choose different debt-to-equity ratios. The associated screening problem results in
an equilibrium that separates entrepreneurs using the share of retained earnings as
a screening device. The level of debt necessary for separation is solely determined
by the incentive constraints. Competition between investors does not allow for any
further price discrimination between types. The government, however, can introduce
taxes such that different types effectively face different mark-ups over actuarially fair
insurance terms. This additional opportunity for discrimination can relax incentive
constraints and lead to a more efficient outcome, with a higher overall degree of
insurance.
To implement the optimal discrimination scheme between types, the government
can make use of the fact that separation occurs along the debt-to-equity ratio. A
differential taxation of income generated with debt versus income generated with
equity financing is one way to achieve optimal discrimination. This mechanism pro-
vides another less obvious justification for a debt bias in corporate income taxation.
It should be noted that while the equilibrium with taxation can be more efficient than
the competitive equilibrium, the necessary discrimination has distributional conse-
quences. I have analyzed a government whose objective is to maximize the revenue
extracted from the entrepreneurs. One might interpret this as a re-distributional ob-
jective away from entrepreneurs and toward other parts of the economy (not modeled
in this paper).
Alternatively, one might consider an economy that would like to attract foreign
entrepreneurs to set up their firms in the country. In the search for an opportu-
nity to finance their projects, entrepreneurs can decide where in the world to set up
their firm. They make this decision solely based on expected utility maximization,
taking into account any uncertainty they might face, and optimizing over the terms
of financing they are offered by investors in different countries. If investors in the
economy are competitive, they might well be able to attract foreign entrepreneurs.
However, all the surplus generated accrues to the entrepreneur, i.e. outside the econ-
omy. The government might then try to regain some of that surplus to distribute it
among members of the economy.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
First, I show that all projects are always implemented: Assumption (A2) implies
that every project has a positive return. Competition between investors and as-
sumption (A5) then imply that every entrepreneur can always issue (safe) debt at
the gross interest rate R = 1. Thus, assumption (A3) implies that every project
generates at least a positive implementation gain for the entrepreneur, even if he
cannot obtain any insurance.
Second, I establish that the only equilibrium is a separating equilibrium. Given
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that all projects are implemented, the screening problem (9) through (11) can be
rewritten as
max
X
β E[u(xL(θL + E) + TL)] + (1− β)E[u(xH(θH + E) + TH)]
s.t. E[u(xL(θL + E) + TL)] ≥ u(ψL) (32)
E[u(xH(θH + E) + TH)] ≥ u(ψH) (33)
E[u(xL(θL + E) + TL)] ≥ E[u(xH(θL + E) + TH)] (34)
E[u(xH(θH + E) + TH)] ≥ E[u(xL(θH + E) + TL)] (35)
β[(1− xL)θL] + (1− β)[(1− xH)θH ] ≥ β TL + β TH . (36)
This is a standard screening problem where maximization of entrepreneurial surplus
is subject to individual rationality and incentive-compatibility constraints, as well as
a zero profit condition for investors. As in the classic Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
setup, a pooling contract cannot be an equilibrium. Due to competition between
investors, the only candidate pooling contract would offer full insurance at average
actuarially fair terms:
(x, T ) = (0, βθL + (1− β)θH). (37)
High types would obtain full insurance but subsidize low types. A profitable devia-
tion is possible. There exists a contract (x′, T ′) that offers less than full insurance
and satisfies:
E[u(x′θH + T ′ + x′E)] > u(βθL + (1− β)θH) (38)
E[u(x′θL + T ′ + x′E)] < u(βθL + (1− β)θH) (39)
Only high types would take up this contract. The investor could offer T ′ so that
the first condition binds, and make a profit. Low types would stick with the pooling
contract, which then makes certain losses. Thus, the pooling contract cannot be an
equilibrium.
Next, it is shown that the only separating equilibrium must be such that type L
entrepreneurs obtain full insurance, and type H entrepreneurs only partial insur-
ance. In a separating equilibrium, the zero profit condition must hold for each type
separately, so that Ti is pinned down by
Ti = (1− xi)θi. (40)
Competition implies that one type will get full insurance. Otherwise, a profit could
be made by offering full insurance to one type. However, contracts (xH = 0, TH =
θH) (full insurance) and (xL > 0, TL = (1 − xL)θL) (partial insurance) can never
satisfy type L’s incentive compatibility constraint (34):
E[u(xLθL + TL + xLE)] = E[u(θL + xLE)] < u(θL) < u(θH). (41)
19
Thus, a separating equilibrium must be such that (xL, TL) = (0, θL), i.e. type L
receives full insurance. Since type H entrepreneurs are also risk-averse, they strictly
prefer higher levels of insurance if offered at actuarially fair terms. The terms are
ensured by competition, so that the unique separating equilibrium is that with the
highest possible level of insurance for type H. It is pinned down by the incentive
constraint of type L (34):
u(θL) = E[u(xHθL + (1− xH)θH) + xHE]. (42)
It remains to be shown that such a separating equilibrium always exists. In Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976), a separating equilibrium might fail to exist, if the terms
offered to type H are so bad that they would prefer to pool with type L. Here, the
worst terms that could possibly be offered to type H entrepreneurs would be no insur-
ance, i.e. (xH , TH) = (1, 0). By assumption (A4), a type H entrepreneur would still
prefer that contract to the full insurance contract offered to type L (xL, TL) = (0, θL):
E[u(θH + E)] = u(CH) > u(θL). (43)
This concludes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
The proof is analogous to that for Lemma (2). It remains true that most surplus is
generated when one type gets full insurance and the other as much as possible, given
incentive-compatibility constraints. One must simply note that the government
cannot increase revenue by implementing a tax such that type H entrepreneurs get
full insurance and type L entrepreneurs get only partial insurance. To make such
contracts incentive-compatible, the government would have to pay a subsidy to type
L entrepreneurs without generating more revenue. Point (iii) is straight forward to
see: the government’s objective is to maximize revenue, so that leaving any surplus
to type H would be wasteful.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
In the competitive equilibrium, type H’s contract (xCH , T
C
H ) = (x
C
H > 0, (1− xCH)θH)
is such that type L’s incentive constraint (9) binds:
E[u(xCHθL + (1− xCH)θH + xCHE)] = u(θL). (44)
Define RXi as the absolute risk premium type i would be willing to pay to avoid the
risk he would be exposed to from holding all the shares in his project under contracts
X:
E[u(θi + E)] = u(θi −RXi ). (45)
Since the aggregate risk is small (by assumption (A2)), the absolute risk premium
can be approximated as
RXi ≈
1
2
rXi V ar(E), (46)
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where rXi = −u
′′
u′ is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion for type i
evaluated under the contract X. Using this definition, condition (44) can be rewritten
as:
u(xCHθL + (1− xCH)θH − (xCH)2RCL ) = u(θL)9 (47)
Thus, xCH solves
(1− xCH)(θH − θL)− (xCH)2RCL = 0. (48)
In the equilibrium with taxes, the incentive constraint is:
E[u(xGHθL + (1− xGH)θH − τH + xGHE)] = u(θL − τL) (49)
and xGH analogously solves
(1− xGH)(θH − θL)− (xCH)2RGL = τH − τL (50)
(1− xGH)(θH − θL)− (xCH)2RCL = τH − τL + (xGH)2(RGL −RCL ). (51)
Thus, generally xGH 6= xCH , i.e. the equilibrium sets of contracts differ.
However, there might exist one specific parameterization such that xGH = x
C
H . Sup-
pose preferences are CARA, so that the absolute risk premium R is constant. If
the surplus taxed from both types is exactly the same, then the set of contracts is
unchanged. The surplus consists of both implementation and insurance gain. The
insurance gain with CARA is proportional to the level of insurance obtained. The
implementation gain would have to be such that it exactly offsets the difference in
insurance. While this is possible, a tiny difference in outside options would already
yield a different set of contracts.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1
In the competitive equilibrium, xCH solves (48):
(1− xCH)(θH − θL)− (xCH)2RCL = 0, (52)
whereas in the equilibrium with taxes, xGH solves (51):
(1− xGH)(θH − θL)− (xCH)2RCL = τH − τL + (xGH)2(RGL −RCL ). (53)
Since preferences are NIARA, RGL ≥ RCL . Thus, when τH > τL, the right-hand side
of (53) is positive, so that xGH < x
C
H .
9Using the fact that V ar(xE) = x2V ar(E).
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